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Abstract In an experiment on markets for services, we find that consumers are likely
to stick to default tariffs and achieve suboptimal outcomes. We find that inattention to
the task of choosing a better tariff is likely to be a substantial problem in addition to
any task and tariff complexity effect. The institutional setup on which we primarily
model our experiment is the UK electricity and gas markets, and our conclusion is
that the new measures by the UK regulator Ofgem to improve consumer outcomes are
likely to be of limited impact.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an experiment trying to identify whether, in markets for services,
consumers are likely to stick to defaults and achieve suboptimal outcomes, and whether
inattention is likely to play a role in explaining why this happens together with the more
traditional explanation of complexity of the decision problem. In order for consumers
to reap benefits from competition, they have to be actively engaged in spotting the
best deal that is available to them. This is true both in the tautological sense that they
are worse off if they go for a suboptimal choice and in the less obvious sense that
firms may be under less competitive pressure if they do so (Giulietti et al. 2005). It is
a stylized fact however that, in a number of liberalized services markets and countries
where choice is possible, consumers do not switch service providers even though the
tariffs they are holding are suboptimal (Jamasb and Pollitt 2005; OFT 2008; Sanco
2010; Lunn 2011); furthermore, when choices are made, there is a question mark
about whether they are necessarily optimal (Joskow 2008; Wilson and Waddams Price
2010). Relevant services markets include both ones that have always been in the hands
of the private sector, such as bank account, mobile telephony and internet services, and
ones that have been opened up to competition in many countries, such as consumer
electricity and gas services, telecommunications services and bank accounts (e.g.,
Ofcom 2009a; Xavier and Ypsilanti 2008; Lunn 2011; OFT 2008).
Undoubtedly, financial switching costs can act as a partial deterrent to changing
services supplier in some cases. Identifying the role of different kinds of switching
costs can be hard with field data, though important attempts have been made with
survey data (Wilson and Waddams Price 2010) and very little switching, compared to
the savings opportunities available, is observed even in markets, such as the UK retail
electricity and gas markets, where financial switching costs are minimal. Attempts
have been made to use survey data to infer non-financial reasons for not switching: the
role of complexity in the tariffs employed and in the number of the tariffs employed
has been claimed (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera 2006; OFT 2008; Garrod et al. 2009;
Sanco 2009; Lunn 2011) and has driven policy recommendations (e.g., Joskow 2008;
Xavier and Ypsilanti 2008; Ofgem 2009b, 2011; Independent Commission on Bank-
ing 2011). For example, it has been brought as a good reason for why the drive for
liberalization of consumer energy markets has halted in USA (Joskow 2008) and for
envisaging requiring tariffs to be simpler in the UK (Ofgem 2011). Carlin (2009),
Gabaix and Laibson (2006), Spiegler (2006) and Ellison and Ellison (2004) provide
models explaining how complexity and confusion inducing strategies may be desirable
for firms.
The potential role of inattention in explaining suboptimal consumer outcomes has
been mentioned, but is, in comparison, somewhat understated.1 Yet, we suspect that,
as with the inattentive agents of Sims (2003), real life time constrained consumers may
1 Using survey data, Giulietti et al. (2005) claimed lack of awareness did not play a big role in lack of
switching in UK energy markets, whereas, using more recent survey data, Wilson and Waddams Price
(2010) could not reject that it did, though their evidence is not unequivocal on what did. Oftel (2000) noted
inertia/lack of interest and lack of awareness of alternatives as two out of four reasons for not switching
supplier in a survey on the telecoms market.
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simply not pay attention to tasks regarding the choices of services. Putting it simply, it
may not be in their minds in the way in which saving 20 cents at a supermarket buying
groceries is.2 The key contribution of this paper is to build on this intuition.
Survey data are clearly useful as they directly refer to real life choices. That said,
when it comes to understand whether complexity or inattention genuinely explain
non-switching behavior and hence potentially justify policy interventions, they suffer
from a number of limitations, and this makes unclear the role of complexity as well as
the role of inattention.3 The limitations include a difficulty to draw clear conclusions
because of a range of alternative and undeclared factors,4 forgetfulness and selectivity
in recall,5 the unconscious nature of many of the choices that people make,6 and/or
the need to self-justify past choices towards those conducting the survey or indeed
to engage in self-deception to rationalize possibly suboptimal choices that one has
done in the past.7 A specific problem lies with the fact that, if a significant part of
the suboptimality of consumer behavior is because consumers do not pay attention,
drawing attention of survey responders to issues they have not thought themselves of
before may not be the best way to identify the extent to which inattention is a problem.
This is because in this case ex post rationalizations may be unavoidable and survey
responses may underestimate the role of inattention.
Our paper addresses these issues by using an experimental methodology. Our first
goal is to verify whether, in the absence of financial switching costs and using the
stylized environment of the UK electricity and gas markets as a benchmark, we can
identify a lack of switching and suboptimal outcomes when switching does take place.
The second goal is to get a better understanding of why suboptimal outcomes take
2 As supermarket shopping becomes increasingly an online shopping experience with default consumer
baskets from previous purchases, supermarket shopping might arguably itself become more sensitive to
inattention problems. There are a number of models of economic behavior incorporating inattention,
such as Hong and Stein (2007), Hirschleifer and Teoh (2003), Gabaix (2011) and Woodford (2012);
Footnote 2 continued
DellaVigna (2009) contains a review of some of the implications. The usual interpretation of inattention is
in terms of lack of consideration of some features of a product. Inattention could however be in relation to
a whole task.
3 Different studies are obviously affected by specific limitations to different degrees, depending on how
the surveys are devised.
4 For example, Coombs and Shaharudin (2012) criticize survey studies on the suboptimality of banking
services supplier choices because of their inability to control for enough alternative explanations. A key
reason is that surveys simply do not control enough for the possibility that, given their preferences, consumers
may be getting a good deal. In a contingent valuation study with US survey data on electricity supply,
Hartman et al. (1991) find a significant status quo bias in terms of stated valuations.
5 King Li (2011) reviews evidence on selectivity in memory recall and presents an experiment this taking
place significantly within just six weeks, if in a different setup.
6 The split between conscious, explicit knowledge and subconscious, implicit knowledge is a well-known
stylized fact in psychology (e.g., Shanks and St John 1994). Sub-thalamic brain activity takes place when
subjects stick with the default, whereas heightened pre-frontal activity takes place when such default is
overridden (Fleming et al. 2010), suggesting that, whereas rejecting the default may require a conscious
effort, sticking with the default does not. Zizzo (2003) shows a dissociation between learning to provide
optimal verbal responses and learning to make the optimal behavioral choices.
7 Psychologists label the tendency for survey responders to provide the responses that they see as putting
them in as good light as possible with the researchers the social desirability bias (e.g., Crowne and David
Marlowe (1964); Stöber 2001).
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place. We test the role of complexity, which we decompose as complexity in the
relationship between prices and quantity (linear vs. non-linear tariffs), in the presence
or absence of bundling (single product vs. dual products tariffs), and in the number of
tariffs.8 We also test, more innovatively, the role of consumer inattention by suitably
developing a methodology based on the presence of a default tariff and an alternative
task, and we consider two possible alternative tasks across different treatments. This
helps us to evaluate policies putting limits on the number and type of tariffs such as the
regulatory constraints on complex tariffs recently proposed or just implemented by the
UK regulator Ofgem (2011, 2014). The paper that is closest to ours is Friesen and Earl
(2013), who look at the choice of complexity in the context of mobile phone plans,
but their focus is on usage uncertainty and they do not look at the role of inattention
(and so they do not have default tasks or an alternative task).
The institutional setup on which we primarily model our experiment is the UK elec-
tricity and gas markets. These are mature markets liberalized since 1996–1999 and
comparatively simple in terms of the product they offer (energy). They are also com-
paratively transparent markets with a wide availability of online search and switching
websites.9 These websites enable both the identification of the best tariffs for any given
level of consumption and easy switching of service provider at the click of a mouse.
Tariffs can be either for electricity only, or for gas only, or they can be dual tariffs
bundling together both electricity and gas; our experiment will focus on electricity
only and dual tariffs.10 The number of tariffs in the market is large: as an illustration,
when we collected data for our experiment, we found as many as 72 electricity and 80
dual tariffs in the London, UK, energy market using an online website.11 As for other
services, consumers tend to stick to their status quo in terms of energy supplier (NERA
2003; Ofgem 2009a; Ofgem 2011; Behavioural Insights Team 2011): this acts as their
default choice. For example, only 18 % of all respondents to a Ofgem consumer survey
switched electricity supplier in 2009, and only 17 % switched gas supplier (Ofgem
2010). Furthermore, when switching takes place, the best (cheapest) tariff is often not
chosen. Using data from 2005 and 2000 surveys, Wilson and Waddams Price (2010)
estimated that only 8 to 20 % of consumers opted for the best tariff given their annual
consumption levels.
Our key finding is that tariff complexity and the number of tariffs matter, but that
inattention matters as well. Regulatory measures to reduce complexity are likely,
therefore, to be of only partial value. Sections 2 and 3 describe the experimental
8 Kalayci and Potters (2011) have an interesting experiment where sellers choose product complexity, in
terms of number of attributes of an abstract product, and find some evidence of consumer exploitability,
though subject to consumers having to make decisions within 15 s; in an experiment again on product
complexity (with products modeled as abstract lotteries) but no time constraints, Sitzia and Zizzo (2011)
find some qualified (though only qualified) evidence of consumer exploitability. Unlike these experiments,
we consider tariff complexity, number of tariffs and product bundling, and we employ tariffs mapped up
from a real world markets. Also, in treatments with time constraints subjects do have anyway plenty of time
to decide (2 min), as verified against a control treatment without such time constraint.
9 Examples include http://www.which.co.uk/switch/, http://www.uswitch.com/, http://www.gocompare.
com/gas-and-electricity/ and http://www.confused.com/gas-electricity.
10 A positive correlation between switching electricity and gas has been found (Giulietti et al. 2005).
11 Ofgem (2012) contains estimates, as do earlier Ofgem retail market reviews.
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design. Sections 4 and 5 present the descriptive statistics and the regression analysis,
respectively. Section 6 provides a discussion and Sect. 7 concludes.
2 Experimental design: basic features
We ran the experiment at our university in 2011 and 2012. Before the beginning of
the experiment, subjects read the instructions and completed a questionnaire with the
purpose of checking they had understood the tasks. If they had any doubts they could
ask for clarification. The experiment involved individual choices where subjects had
repeated opportunities to choose among a set of tariffs. There were 36 rounds. In each
round subjects were asked to choose one among 24 different tariffs. Once they had
chosen their preferred tariff they were asked to choose a consumption level for that
tariff (five levels of consumption12 were allowed: 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 and 5,000
units). Once they had done that, the earnings for that tariff and level of consumption
were displayed on the screen.
Revenues were exogenously given in a table for each level of consumption. The
higher was the level of consumption the higher were the revenues. Costs depended on
the tariff chosen and the level of consumption. The higher was the level of consumption
the higher were the costs. Earnings were then calculated subtracting the costs from the
revenues. The revenues for each level of consumption are presented in Table 1. They
were such that for any tariff the optimal level of consumption was 4,000 units.13 In
all treatments subjects were assigned a default tariff. They could either stick to that
tariff or have a look at the other tariffs and change it if they wanted to. At the end
of the experiment, one of the 36 tasks was chosen randomly and subjects were paid
according to the choice made in that task.14 Average earnings were around 20 pounds.
The experimental instructions and details on all tariff tasks are in an online appendix.
The tariffs. In February 2011, we collected all the electricity and gas tariffs available
in the UK market as available to a London consumer using the “Which?” website.
The tariffs ranged from simple ones with one tier (i.e. a single marginal price) to
more complicated ones with two tiers and a ceiling (i.e. a marginal price and, once
consumption exceeds a ceiling, a second and lower marginal prices) or a standing
charge and one tier (i.e. a fixed price plus a single marginal price). The tariffs in our
experiment were partly real tariffs collected in this way and partly derived (i.e. created)
by us using the same structure as the real ones (derived tariffs in what follows). The
process of selection and derivation of all tariffs, as well as the full list, is described in
12 Actual consumers of course do not have pre-defined possible levels of consumption. By having only
five levels, we wished to keep things as simple as possible in this part of the experiment, however, bearing
in mind that actual consumers do have past consumption as a guide to future consumption, and so the level
of consumption is not that much of an issue.
13 The average yearly household electricity consumption in the UK is around 4,000 kwh. The gas con-
sumption is approximately four times this amount; in the experiment, we scaled this down by a factor of 4
for simplicity.
14 In all treatments, subjects could use a calculator on the computer screen to help them with their choices
of tariffs and consumption levels. The calculator had four boxes for inputting consumption levels and the
values of tier 1, tier 2, ceiling and standing charge of the tariff they wanted to check the cost of.
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Table 1 Revenues and Sample of Tariffs
Consumption Good A Good B
Revenue Revenue
1,000 45,000 35,000
2,000 80,000 61,000
3,000 106,000 78,000
4,000 122,000 88,000
5,000 128,000 89,000
Values are in experimental points. Earnings in experimental points were equal to revenue associated to
a given consumption level minus the tariff cost of such consumption level. The tariffs cost was equal to
Tier 1 × Consumption for simple tariffs; to Tier 1 × Consumption (for Consumption ≤ Ceiling) + Tier
2 × (Consumption–Ceiling) (for Consumption > Ceiling), for complex tariffs; to Standing charge + Tier
1 × Consumption
detail in an online appendix. We employed 144 tariffs. Two-thirds of the tariffs were
real and one-third was derived. The real tariffs were half for a single service (these are
electricity tariffs) and the other half were dual tariffs (both gas and electricity). The
derived tariffs were all dual ones. Subjects were only told that the tariffs related either
to one good or to two goods (labeled as good A and good Baseline). Table 1 shows a
sample of tariffs used. The difference between the best tariff and the second best tariff
was always at least 3 pounds.
The default tariff. The default tariff was always a derived tariff designed in such a way
that it was never the best to maximize earnings. The difference between the default
tariff and the best tariff was usually at least around 6 pounds.
Nature of the tariffs employed in each task. The order of the 36 tasks was randomized.
• Number of tariffs. Half of the tasks employed 4 tariffs and the other half 24.
• Complexity of tariffs. 1/3 of the tasks only involved single real tariffs, 1/3 of the
tasks only employed dual real tariffs and 1/3 of the tasks only employed dual derived
tariffs.
• Mix of tariffs. 1/4 of the tasks only employed simple tariffs (both single and dual
tariffs with only one tier); 1/4 of the tasks involved only complex tariffs (both single
and dual ones with either two tiers or one tier and standing charge); the rest involved
a mix of both simple and complex tariffs (half of each).
3 The experimental treatments
Treatment baseline (30 subjects). This treatment had a default tariff and a search
engine. In each task subjects were shown the default tariff in a first screen; from this
screen subjects could either stick to the default tariff or go to a second screen where
they could see all the tariffs involved with the default tariff highlighted (see Figs. 1 , 2).
For each task, if subjects did not make a choice within 2 min, they were assigned the
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Fig. 1 The 1st Screenshot in the Baseline, Web and Grid Treatments
default tariff.15 When deciding the tariff to select, subjects could use a search engine,
which was a stylized version of internet search engines: subjects had to provide the
default tariff details and a consumption level; the search engine would then give the
entire list of tariffs with the difference in earnings relative to the default tariff.
Treatment web (alternative internet task – 30 subjects). This treatment involves two
different tasks displayed in two different screens. In one computer screen subjects had
the tariff task implemented as in the baseline treatment. In another screen they could
browse the web but were not paid for that, in fact only the tariff task was incentivized.
If in any given period they did not make any active choice in the tariff task within
2 min, the default tariff was selected for them; they were then required to select their
consumption level.
Treatment grid (alternative counting task – 50 subjects). In this treatment, subjects
again had two screens in front of them. In one they could perform the tariff tasks.
In the other, they could perform a counting task consisting in counting the 1s in 0–1
grids (see Fig. 3). This is a task deemed unpleasant enough in the real effort literature
(as in Abeler et al. 2011) as to be considered a good measure of real effort. In our
15 Based on other treatments without this time cutoff, described in the working paper version of this paper
(Sitzia et al. 2013), we knew that subjects take around 1 min to make a choice. We then fixed the 2 min
cutoff so that we are comfortable that any difference in behavior cannot be attributed to subjects simply not
having the time to take a decision.
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Fig. 2 The Tariff Task Screenshot in the Baseline, Web and Grid Treatments
experiment, and as made clear in the instructions, it was also entirely unincentivized,
which means that subjects should have ignored the task and focused entirely on the
tariff tasks, on which their earnings depended exclusively. By comparing performance
in the Web and the Grid treatment, we can verify whether the nature of the alternative
task matters for our results.
Treatment salient (alternative salient counting task – 50 subjects).This is the key
treatment of our experiment. We employed the same counting task as in Grid, but the
grid was now placed on the first screen of each task (see Fig. 4). On the same screen
subjects also saw the default tariff and so, if they wished, they could choose this tariff
in this screen and move straight to the consumption page. Alternatively they could opt
to see all the tariffs involved in the task and select the tariff of their choice as usual.
Using the language of Zizzo (2010), our experimental manipulation deliberately
employs a purely cognitive experimenter demand effect as an experimental tool to
make subjects pay attention as a default to the counting task.16 We would argue that,
16 Again in the language of that paper, this is akin to a legitimate magnifying glass use of experimenter
demand effects: namely, one that employs demand effects as an artificial tool to replicate in the laboratory
real world conditions that would otherwise not be paralleled. A purely cognitive experimenter demand
effect relates to the cognitive process by which subjects make sense of an unfamiliar laboratory decision
environment, and in this case can be seen to underpin treating the counting task as a default. It does not
involve a desire to do what is perceived as what an experimenter wishes them to do, which we discuss next.
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Fig. 3 Alternative Counting Task in the Web and Grid Treatments
even with this purely cognitive experimenter demand, the tariff task is likely to be
more salient in the experiment than going to a switching website can ever be for real
world households. As a result, our inattention manipulation is likely to simply provide
lower bounds on the kind of effects that inattention may produce in the real world.
The comparison between performance in the Grid and the Salient treatments will be
especially useful in isolating this effect as the alternative task is the same in the two
treatments. As a result, a preference for the alternative task would not be able to explain
any differential performance between the two treatments.17
17 In further treatments described in the working paper version of this paper (Sitzia et al. 2013), we address
the potential criticism that subjects may not be inattentive as a result of a purely cognitive experimenter
demand effect, but rather may simply want to do what they think the experimenter wants them to do. This
would be a form of social experimenter demand effect (Zizzo 2010), that would be incompatible with our
inattention interpretation. Sitzia et al. (2013) ran treatments where subjects who ended with suboptimal
outcomes were told that they could have made more money by making another choice. If subjects felt that
they were not supposed to focus on the tariff task because this was not what we wanted of them, by telling
them that they could have earned more money by choosing another tariff, and indeed telling them repeatedly
and insistently that this was the case if they kept ignoring the tariff task, the experimenters made clear that
this was not what was wanted at all. However, as described in Sitzia et al. (2013), we found similar results
to the inattention treatments described in this paper, which runs against a social experimenter demand effect
interpretation. The working paper also describes questionnaire evidence against such an interpretation.
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Fig. 4 1st Screenshot with Default Tariff and Counting Task in the Salient treatment
4 Descriptive statistics
4.1 Overview
We classify subjects’ choices in three ways: subjects choose the best tariff, subjects
stick to the default tariff and subject switch to a suboptimal tariff (i.e. a tariff that
is not the best tariff). We define the default rate as the percentage of times subjects
stick to the default tariff, and the suboptimal switching rate as the percentage of
times subjects switch to a suboptimal tariff. The suboptimal outcome rate is therefore
defined as the sum of the default rate and suboptimal switching rate. If we define
the optimal outcome rate as the percentage of times a subject choose the best tariff,
then the suboptimal outcome rate plus the optimal outcome rate is equal to 1. We
will focus on the suboptimal outcome rate and its two components, default rates and
suboptimal switching rates. Table 2 presents default rates, suboptimal switching rates
and suboptimal choices for the four treatments.
4.2 The role of inattention
Treatments Web, Grid and Salient verify the impact of inattention on consumer behav-
ior in particular when compared to the baseline treatment. As previously noted, inat-
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Table 2 Key Descriptive Statistics
Treatment Type of market Complexity of task Number of
tariffs per task
Overall
Single market Dual
market
All
simple
All
complex
Mixed 4 Tariffs 24 Tariffs
Panel a - default rates
Baseline 0.114 0.160 0.117 0.178 0.143 0.146 0.143 0.144
Web 0.211 0.286 0.261 0.272 0.258 0.274 0.248 0.261
Grid 0.262 0.298 0.267 0.313 0.284 0.274 0.298 0.286
Salient 0.462 0.456 0.447 0.473 0.457 0.438 0.478 0.458
Average 0.287 0.319 0.267 0.330 0.284 0.301 0.316 0.309
Panel b - suboptimal switching rates
Baseline 0.275 0.297 0.167 0.339 0.308 0.185 0.394 0.290
Web 0.236 0.239 0.133 0.272 0.256 0.154 0.322 0.238
Grid 0.215 0.207 0.140 0.237 0.220 0.118 0.301 0.209
Salient 0.167 0.176 0.127 0.193 0.179 0.100 0.246 0.173
Average 0.215 0.207 0.140 0.237 0.220 0.118 0.301 0.209
Panel c - suboptimal outcome rates
Baseline 0.389 0.457 0.283 0.517 0.451 0.331 0.537 0.434
Web 0.447 0.525 0.394 0.544 0.514 0.428 0.570 0.499
Grid 0.477 0.505 0.407 0.550 0.504 0.392 0.599 0.496
Salient 0.628 0.632 0.573 0.667 0.636 0.538 0.723 0.631
Average 0.502 0.539 0.433 0.579 0.537 0.433 0.621 0.527
tention is difficult to study in an experimental setting because there is a natural bias that
subjects have (in coming to the lab) to do something; this is different from households
not paying attention to specific tasks, such as choices of services, because it is not part
of their weekly, monthly or yearly routines.
Table 2 and Fig. 5 present default rates, suboptimal switching rates and suboptimal
choices for the all treatments that implement an alternative task. Let us start by noticing
that default choice rates in the treatments that implement alternative tasks are all higher
than default choice rates in our baseline treatment (Mann-Whitney p < 0.001 in all
cases).18 The difference is smaller for the Web and the Grid treatments than for the
Salient treatment.
To remind the reader, the only difference between Web and Grid is the nature of
the alternative task. In the Web treatment the alternative task is the internet task. In
the Grid treatment the alternative task is a counting task. Both tasks are displayed on a
different screen from the tariff task. Table 2 shows that in both treatments suboptimal
18 In this paper between treatments comparisons are tested using Mann-Whitney tests while within treat-
ment ones are tested using Wilcoxon tests. All reported p values are two-sided. For all bivariate tests, unless
specified otherwise, tests are run at the subject level to control for any within-subject non independence of
observations. A regression analysis is provided in the online appendix.
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Fig. 5 Suboptimal Outcome
Rates by Treatment
outcome rates are about 50 %, roughly equally split between default choice rate and
suboptimal switching rate. We observe no differences between the two treatments.
Remark 1 The default rate and suboptimal switching rates, and consequently the sub-
optimal outcome rate, is not different between the Web and the Grid treatments. There
is no support for the nature of the alternative task making a difference.
We do observe a significant increase in the default rates when we compare the
Salient and Grid treatments. The only difference between them is the saliency of the
alternative counting task. In the Salient treatment, the counting task is shown on the
same screen as the tariff task. Table 2 shows that that the default choice rate jumps
up to 46 % in Salient (Mann-Whitney p < 0.03). The suboptimal switching rate is
lower in Salient though the effect is marginal or insignificant (Mann-Whitney p =
0.09). Overall, 63 % of outcomes were suboptimal in Salient, against 50 % in Grid
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.05). The different default rates between Grid and Salient can be
interpreted in terms of inattention. Further support for this interpretation is provided
in Sect. 5.
Remark 2 The default choice rate is significantly higher in the Salient than in the Grid
treatment, and three times as large as in Baseline. Overall suboptimal outcomes go up
by 20 % in Salient relative to Baseline. Inattention matters.
Table 3 reports several other variables (other than average earnings) that can be used
to gauge the extent of inattention in the Salient treatment. Specifically, the variable
Search Engine shows the proportion of times subjects used the search engine. The
number of times that subjects have ended up with the default in the first screen (that is
the screen where only the default tariff is displayed, or the default tariff and counting
task) is around 40 % in the Salient treatment, about 20 % in the Grid and Web treatment
and much less (8 %) in the Baseline treatment. A sign of the effect of inattention to
the tariff task is in the proportion of subjects who ended up in the Salient treatment
relative to the other treatments with the default tariff in the first screen because they
did not make an active choice: this proportion was around 17.5 % in the Salient
treatment and less than 5 % in the others. Another sign of the effect of inattention is
the number of counting tasks that subjects did in the Salient treatment relative to the
Grid treatment. They did more than three times as many counting tasks on average in
the Salient treatment relative to the Grid treatment (164 in the Salient treatment versus
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Table 3 Other Variables
Treatment Calculator Search engine Default 1st screen Engagement
counting task
Earnings
Baseline 0.881 0.250 0.084 – 71,730
Web 0.655 0.243 0.200 – 70,521
Grid 1.105 0.284 0.207 46.398 69,969
Salient 1.217 0.155 0.396 163.760 64,966
Total 0.997 0.230 0.242 106.842 68,839
Calculator: the number of times in average that subjects used the calculator in the tariff task (Fig. 2); Search
engine: the number of times on average that subject used the search engine. The search engine could only
be used in the tariff task. Default on the first screen: proportion of times subjects chose the default in the
first screen (see Fig. 1); Engagement Counting Task: number of grids subjects engaged with. This variable
is only available for Grid and Salient treatments; Earnings: this variable represents the average earnings per
treatment. Given that in the dual markets the number of experimental points earned were double but the
conversion rate was 1/2 than in the other tasks, we have normalized this variable to account for this
51 in the Grid treatment; Mann-Whitney p < 0.001).19 In the Salient treatment the
engagement with the task and default rates are strongly positively related, unlike in
the Grid treatment (Spearman ρ = 0.56, p < 0.001, in Salient, vs. 0.17, p = 0.24 in
Grid).
4.3 The role of complexity
Table 2 shows averages of our three key variables for different dimensions of com-
plexity. We will provide regression results later on to see the effects of complexity on
our key variables. For now we merely notice that product bundling (dual markets vs.
single markets) seems to have a small impact on the default rate and an even smaller
effect on the suboptimal switching rate. The complexity of the tariffs employed seems
to influence both the default tariff rate and switching rate, and, consequently, the sub-
optimal outcome rate. The number of tariffs has a small impact on the default rate
and a more sizeable one on the suboptimal switching rate, and, consequently, on the
suboptimal outcome rate.
5 Regressions
In this section we present three sets of regressions to shed light on what the role
of inattention and complexity is in driving consumer outcomes, and which factors
influence earnings, the use of search engine and calculator.
19 The proportion of subjects that played the counting task at least once is also greater in the Salient
treatment (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.001).
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5.1 Regressions on whole sample
In this section we estimate several models on the default rate, the switching rate and
the suboptimal outcome rate, plus the default rate occurring in the first screen. All the
regressions have been estimated using Probit with robust standard error to control for
the fact that our observations are clustered at a subject level.
The variables we use in the models are as follows:
Period: this variable captures learning over time. Learning implies a negative coeffi-
cient.
Period∧2: this is period squared. If there is learning but only up to a certain point, we
expect this variable to have a small positive coefficient.
Dual market: this is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if markets are for two goods
and 0 otherwise.
Complex tariffs: this variable takes value 1 in tasks if all tariffs are complex and 0
otherwise.
Mixed tariffs: this variable takes value 1 when the task involves both complex tariffs
and simple tariffs, 0 otherwise.
Number of tariffs: this variable takes value 1 when the task involves 24 tariffs, 0
otherwise.
Calculator: this variable takes value 1 if the subject has used a calculator in the tariff
task screen (i.e. where they see all tariffs), 0 otherwise.
Search engine: this variable takes value 1 if subjects use the search engine, 0 otherwise.
Baseline, Web and Grid: these variables are dummies for our control treatments, equal
to 1 in the Baseline, Web and Grid treatments respectively, and 0 otherwise. Our
benchmark treatment is the Salient one.
Nationality, Gender and Age: these are demographic variables. Nationality is 1 if
subjects are British, 0 otherwise. Gender is equal to 1 for men, else 0.
Regressions on the default rate. Table 4 shows that, independently of the model esti-
mated, the default rate decreases over time but the decrease peters out with time as
shown by the combined Period and Period∧2 coefficients. Subjects also stick more to
the default tariff when tariffs are complex. There is strong evidence in most of the mod-
els we estimate that the default rate increases when tariffs are complex. The use of the
calculator and search engine is negatively correlated with the default rate. There is also
strong evidence that subjects choose less frequently the default tariff in the Baseline
treatment compared to the Salient one; the Baseline has in fact the lowest estimated
coefficient, by around 28–32 % depending on the model specification. In the other two
treatments the effect is milder but still significant in most model specifications.
Regressions on the suboptimal switching rate. Independently of the specification of
the model, we find that the suboptimal switching rate is greater when tariffs are both
all complex and mixed and when the number of tariffs is 24. A greater use of the cal-
culator is positively correlated with the suboptimal switching rate (probably because,
if subjects are confused, they use the calculator more, to get an idea of which one is
the best tariff). The search engine, as expected, is negatively correlated with the sub-
optimal switching rate. The Baseline treatment has a significantly higher suboptimal
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Inattentive consumers in markets for services
switching than the Salient treatment, by around 12–13 %. The effect is smaller for
Web and Grid, and mostly not significant for Grid.20
Regressions on the suboptimal outcome rate. The suboptimal outcome rate is the sum
of the default rate and the suboptimal switching rate and so it is not surprising that
the complexity effects from the number and mix of tariffs, and the small one from
dual tariffs, is replicated in terms of a higher suboptimal outcome rate. The search
engine is negatively correlated with the suboptimal outcome rate and so is the use
of the calculator, as the negative coefficient on the default rate more than offsets the
positive coefficient on the suboptimal switching rate. The coefficients on Baseline are
all statistically significant and always negative. Relative to the Baseline, the effect
is around 18 % and between 15 and 19 % depending on the model specification.
The effects are smaller and always negative for Web and Grid but still statistically
significant in three models out of four for the Web treatment and two out of four for
the Grid.21
Remark 3 The regression analysis confirms that, while the suboptimal switching rate
goes down in Salient relative to the Baseline and changes only by little relative to
Grid and Web, the inattention effect produced by the Salient treatment manipulation
leads to a significantly higher default rate and this, in turn, leads to a significantly
higher suboptimal rate. The effect size on the suboptimal outcome rate is around 20 %
relative to the Baseline.
Regression on the default rate in first screen. The dependent variable in this regression
is restricted to the subjects that choose the default tariff in the first screen without
even having a look at all the tariffs in the subsequent screen.22 The treatment variables
coefficient estimates are similar to the corresponding coefficients in the Default Tariff
regressions. This shows that the differences among treatments are mainly driven by
the decisions of those subjects that stick to the default tariff in the first screen and that
this takes place significantly more in the Salient treatment than in the others.
5.2 Regressions on sub-sample
In order to further test the interpretation that the differences among treatments are
mainly driven by subjects who end up with the default tariff in the first screen, we
now estimate regressions with the sub-sample of subjects that did not end up with
the default tariff in the first screen.23 If this interpretation is correct, we would expect
the coefficients on the treatment variable to be small relative to those observed on the
default rates and suboptimal outcome rates in the Table 4 regressions.
20 We find mild evidence that nationality has a positive effect on suboptimal switching rates.
21 There some evidence to suggest that men obtain less suboptimal outcomes than women, though this is
not entirely robust to the model specification. Such an effect would follow from the fact that men stick less
to the default tariff than women.
22 The Calculator and Search Engine variables are omitted from this regression because, by definition,
they are equal to 0 if the subject simply ends up with the default tariff on the first screen.
23 Again, we employ Probit regressions with robust standard error to control for the fact that our observa-
tions are clustered at a subject level.
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Table 5 reports the results of regressions on our key variables using the sub-sample.
In line with this interpretation, in comparing the Table 5 with the Table 3 default rate
regressions, the coefficients on Baseline, Web and Grid have dropped considerably;
for example, the Baseline coefficient has dropped from around 28–32 % to just 5 %
and even smaller in the Web treatment and particularly the Grid treatment were the
difference with the Salient is not anymore significant.24 This leads to smaller, and
never statistically significant, coefficients in the suboptimal outcome rate regressions.
Conversely, the effects of complexity and of learning appear roughly the same when
comparing the full sample of Table 4 with the sub-sample of Table 5.
Remark 4 The differences in default rates and suboptimal outcome rates between
Salient and the other treatments is mainly driven by subjects ending up with the
default tariff in the first screen; when these subjects are removed, the differences
become small, and disappear completely in the suboptimal outcome rates regressions.
Result 4 supports the interpretation that inattention to the tariffs task is responsible
for the higher default rates and higher suboptimal outcome rates in Salient relative to
the other treatments. Such inattention is brought about by the saliency of the alternative
task.
5.3 Calculator, search engine and earnings
Table 6 presents Probit regression with clustered standard errors at a subject level on
what affects the use of the calculator and search engine and regressions on what affects
earnings. The regression on earnings is estimated using OLS estimators with robust
standard errors also clustered at the subject level.
Use of calculator. The dependent variable in this regression is as defined previously,
i.e. the use of the calculator in the tariff task screen shot where subject see all tariffs
in that round. According to Table 6, subjects use less the calculator over time and
slightly less in markets for two tariffs and when the number of tariffs is 24. Subjects
use the calculator almost every period in all treatments (on average above 82 % for all
treatments), which may contribute explaining why there is little variation in the use of
the calculator across treatments.
Use of search engine. The dependent variable in this regression is equal to 1 if subjects
have used the search engine and 0 otherwise. Table 3 reports the average use of the
search engine in all three treatments. Subjects can only use the search engine in the
tariff task screen shot so these regressions are only run on the subsample where subjects
have not chosen the default tariff in the first screen. Table 6 shows that subjects tend
to use more the search engine as time goes by but this effect decreases over time. The
24 One might wonder whether this is a trivial implication of selecting the sample of subjects who has not
chosen the default in the first screen. However, what these coefficients are picking up is not that the overall
default rate is lower (which is trivially true) but rather that the incidence of default rates is very different
between the Salient and the other treatments when the full sample is used, and different only by about 1/4
between the Salient and the other treatments when the cases where the default tariff was selected in the first
screen are excluded.
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Table 6 Regressions on the Use
of the Calculator and of the
Search Engine and on Earnings
n = 5670. The regression on
earnings is OLS, the others are
Probit. Errors are clustered at the
subject level. Marginal
coefficients are shown.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
Dependent
variable:
Calculator Search engine Earnings
Period −0.009*** 0.010*** 758***
(0.002) (0.003) (78)
Period∧2 0.0001 −0.0002*** −15***
(0.00006) (0.00006) (2)
Dual market −0.069*** 0.004 −304
(0.008) (0.008) (317)
Complex tariffs 0.006 0.023* −1109*
(0.016) (0.012) (586)
Mixed tariffs 0.013 0.016* −460
(0.012) (0.009) (429)
Number of tariffs −0.049*** 0.012 −1698***
(0.011) (0.009) (341)
Calculator −0.019** 348***
(0.008) (79)
Search engine −0.068 3864***
(0.043) (1070)
Baseline 0.061 0.097 8447***
(0.062) (0.078) (2030)
Web 0.022 0.083 8319***
(0.059) (0.080) (2318)
Grid 0.101* 0.133** 7269***
(0.056) (0.064) (1980)
Nationality 0.010 −0.069 1410
(0.045) (0.056) (2239)
Gender 0.045 0.011 3457**
(0.041) (0.052) (1501)
Age 0.001 0.011 399
(0.007) (0.008) (347)
Constant 45581***
(8155)
use of the calculator is a substitute tool for the use of the search engine. There is also
mild evidence that subjects use more the search engine when tariffs are complex or
mixed. The treatment coefficients are positive, and mildly significant in the case of the
Grid treatment, suggesting a greater use of the search engine in this treatment than in
Salient.25
25 There is evidence at the 0.1 level that subjects use more the search engine when not all tariffs are simple,
possibly as some subjects realise its usefulness.
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Earnings. Regressions on earnings complement the analysis of suboptimal outcome
rates in the previous sections.26 There is evidence of learning over time but this peters
out with time. Plausibly, using the calculator and the search engines is correlated with
higher earnings. The complexity effect from the number of tariffs carries through and
reduces earnings, with milder evidence for the complexity of the tariffs themselves.
When combining all dimensions of complexity, that is comparing the case with 24 dual
and complex tariffs with that with 4 single and simple tariffs, according to the regres-
sion model the difference complexity made to earnings was around 2,800 points.27
The inattention effect captured by the treatment effects was considerably larger
than this, with coefficients between around 8,400 and 7,300 points more earned
in treatments other than the Salient treatment. This points to the importance of
dealing with the inattention problem rather than just focusing on the complexity
problem.
6 Discussion
6.1 Are outcomes suboptimal?
A significant fraction of consumers makes suboptimal choices, either because of stick-
ing to a default or because of switching to a suboptimal choice. In the Baseline treat-
ment where there is only one activity available, even with just 4 tariffs about 1/3 of
the choices are suboptimal, rising to over a half when there are 24 tariffs (Table 2);
subjects stick to the default in only around 15 % of cases, which does not seem to
fit with real world stylized facts regarding the percentage of consumers not switching
(e.g., DECC 2012). One key reason of difference is that real world consumers may
simply not pay attention to saving money from switching energy supplier: their routine
activities in their everyday life are more prominent. There is not a point in time in the
day, the week, the month or even the year where, as a routine, subjects are required
to pay attention to the task of choosing energy supplier, as there is anyway a default
energy supplier; there is no equivalent of, say, the weekly major supermarket shop-
ping trip that a household may do every Saturday morning in order not to run out of
food. Conversely, subjects come to the laboratory with an expectation that they need
to pay attention and engage in a task and it is no surprise that, given the availability
of a search engine, they use it to get to much better outcomes, as we would expect
with real world consumers as well. The question then becomes why, in the real world,
consumers do not use search engines in an equally effective way. Our intuition is that,
because consumers do not pay attention, they often do not get to the stage where they
are faced with a search engine: the problem may be made simple but this is not enough
if it is simply not in their minds.
26 Recall that 3,500 points = 1 pound. When tariffs are for dual markets however there are two tariffs and
experimental points earned as twice as much than for single market. For dual market tasks the conversion
rate however was 7,000 points to a pound. In order to take this into account, and for the purpose of our
analysis, we have normalised earnings by dividing by two the experimental points earned in dual markets.
27 Men also earned around 4,851 experimental points more on average.
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To test this intuition, we added either a not salient task (Web, Grid treatments) or
a salient (Salient treatment) alternative task for subjects to engage in. The salience of
the alternative task was used as a tool to induce inattention, if much less than what
can be expected in the real world.28
In our Salient treatment, as many as around 45 % of choices stuck to the default,
and even with just 4 tariffs over half of the choices are suboptimal. Overall suboptimal
outcomes go up by 20 % in Salient relative to Baseline (Result 2), and our regression
analysis confirms the existence of a quantitatively large effect (Result 3), and one that
is replicated if one uses earnings as dependent variable (Sect. 5.3). We interpret this as
an inattention effect, and this is supported by the fact that the effect is mainly driven
by subjects ending up with the default tariff on the first screen (Result 4), the one with
just the alternative task in the Salient treatment. It is also supported by the fact that
subjects were more engaged with the alternative, counting task in the Salient treatment
(Sect. 4.2).
We found a small complexity effect involving product bundling, and larger ones
related to whether the tariff is linear or non-linear, and whether there are 4 or 24 tar-
iffs. That said, the effect of product bundling was small enough that it did not affect
earnings to a statistically significant degree, and the overall impact of our complexity
manipulations on earnings was less than half that found for our treatment manipu-
lations identifying inattention effects. In essence, complexity does matter; however,
economists and policy makers should pay more attention to the role of inattention29
for tasks that do not fit in the usual household consumption routines.30
By unpacking the psychological determinants of switching costs, however, the
experimental methodology does allow to provide clear-cut messages on the poten-
tial effectiveness of policy measures either tackling them or not. Furthermore, the
direction for consumer welfare improvements is clear, unlike survey studies where,
as per Coombs and Shaharudin (2012) critique, it is not necessarily obvious whether
consumers may be getting a good deal after all.
Our experimental evidence suggests that even restrictive regulatory measures forc-
ing tariffs to be linear and only four—with the potentially distorting effects on com-
petition that such restrictions may have—would still only help partially. Even more
so, the scope in the UK of Ofgem’s (2014) measures to limit the number of tariffs
provided by each firm to 4 per fuel, meter and payment type, will be only of partial
help, as the number of tariffs in the market as a whole is likely to remain above our
28 Given the experimental constraints, the instructions need to be clear about the nature of the tariff task
and this remains one of two possible tasks available to subjects. This, together with the natural bias of
experimental subjects to do things, implies that what we have is just a lower bound to the type of real world
inattention problem that we are trying to model in the laboratory.
29 Chetty et al. (2009) have noted the connection between salience and attention in terms of features of a
task in an important paper on consumer responses to taxation.
30 This last qualification is important. Our conclusions apply to the use of services with a default choice
and which are not part of the regular routines of consumers in terms of what they pay attention to. Buying
groceries at a (physical) supermarket would not qualify. Equally, buying a car would not qualify because,
while not part of a usual routine, it does require an active choice (there is not a ‘default car’ which is bought
automatically unless an action is taken). The more active choices are taken, the more the potential role of
complexity in affecting consumer outcomes.
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experimental upper number of 24 tariffs; and their regulation of the complexity of
tariffs will still mean that there are non-linear tariffs and so we shall still be in the
world of ranges of complex tariffs or of mixed complexity tariffs. There are, of course,
good (technical and competitive) reasons why Ofgem cannot simply the market further.
More fundamentally, Ofgem’s (2014) measures will have limited impact as they do not
tackle the inattention problem and this may be at least as significant as the complexity
problem.
7 Conclusions
We found that, in markets for services and even in the presence of a search engine,
consumers are likely to stick to defaults and achieve suboptimal outcomes. The exper-
iment aimed to unpack two key psychological reasons why they do this—complexity
(in terms of non-linearity, number and bundling of tariffs) and consumer inattention.
By employing an experimental methodology, we are in a position not only to identify
the causal role of different psychological dimensions, but we are also able to test the
effectiveness of policies designed to improve consumer outcomes. Our experiment,
and our tariffs, are inspired by stylized features of UK electricity and gas markets, but
the lessons we draw are likely to be more general, as both underlying features (such
as non-linear tariffs and the presence of defaults) and psychological mechanisms are
obviously more general.
Task complexity matters to some degree. However, in the presence of a default tariff
and a tariffs choice not being one which is salient to subjects relative to alternative
tasks, suboptimal outcomes will be achieved because of consumer inattention. Based
on our findings, Ofgem’s (2014) measures to try to obtain better consumer outcomes
in the UK energy retail market are likely to be of only limited impact.
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